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fter a merger, company ofﬁcials face the challenge of making compensation schemes uniform and of
redesigning teams with managers from companies with different incentives, work habits, and recruiting
methods. In this paper, we investigate the relationship between executive pay and performance after a merger
by dissociating the respective inﬂuence of shifts, which occur in both compensation incentives and team compo-
sition. The results of a real task experiment conducted with managers within a large pharmaceutical company
not only show that changes in compensation incentives affect performance, but also suggest that the sorting
effect of incentives in the previous companies impact cooperation and efﬁciency after the merger. Replicating
this experiment with students showed differences in strategy rather than in substance between the two groups
of subjects with managers appearing performance driven, while students are more cost driven.
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1. Introduction
There is strong evidence of the existence of hetero-
geneity among the compensation packages applied by
ﬁrms within the same industry. It is not surprising to
ﬁnd that after a merger, difﬁculties can arise because
of the different compensation policies of the newly
merged ﬁrms, and that new consolidated policies
need to be designed. Furthermore, downsizing and
the reorganization of production entail a reshufﬂing
of teams, which affects executives from the companies
involved in the merger. To promote social cohesion,
mergers usually lead to the harmonization of com-
pany statutes, so that all executives are paid according
to the same compensation schemes. But within new
teams comprised of executives of the merged compa-
nies, performance also depends on the willingness of
individuals to cooperate with others. This willingness
to cooperate may be affected by the heterogeneity
of past compensation practices, work habits, and
nonmarket interactions. Many pitfalls can hamper an
empirical analysis of the relationship between new
executive pay packages and executive performance
after a merger. The impact of new compensation
packages may differ from one employee to another
depending on the short-, medium-, and long-term
inﬂuence of preceding modes of compensation (see
Nalbantian and Schotter 1997). Thus, assessing the
impact of new compensation schemes on executive
performance after a merger requires controlling for
the possibility of the long-term impacts of the com-
pensation packages used before the merger. Further-
more, unbiased estimates of the relationship between
pay and performance require disentangling the effects
of shifts in direct incentives from the effects of the
emergence of a new group culture founded on a vari-
ety of previous corporate cultures (Kreps 1990). Indi-
viduals coming from a variety of previous cultures,
with different norms of fairness and social compar-
ison, could be expected to behave differently in the
new company. Previous cultures can affect the efﬁ-
ciency of a new uniﬁed compensation policy, particu-
larly in the short run. Experimental methods can help
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in circumventing part of these difﬁculties through the
comparison of various treatments in a controlled envi-
ronment. This point has been successfully made in
the context of a merger by Camerer and Weber (2003)
who show that performance decreases following the
merger of two laboratory ﬁrms because of failure in
coordination.
In this paper, we design an experiment to ana-
lyze the relationship between executive compensa-
tion schemes and performance after a merger. Our
laboratory experiment was conducted with 36 man-
agers of a large pharmaceutical company created by
the recent merger of two companies—one French and
one German. It was replicated with 72 students in
Lyon and Montréal. Thus, this paper also contributes
to the literature on subject pool effects by compar-
ing decisions made by student-subjects and manager-
subjects. Studies by Dyer et al. (1989) and Carpenter
et al. (2003) have underlined differences (risk atti-
tudes, fairness) and similarities (winner’s curse)
across subject pools. Hannan et al. (2002) show that
MBA effort levels are greater than those of undergrad-
uate students, and Fehr and List (2004) observe that
CEOs exhibit more trustful behavior. How can one
explain that in some games expertise seems to inﬂu-
ence behavior whereas in others it has no signiﬁcant
inﬂuence? Cooper et al. (1999) emphasize the rela-
tionship between context and expertise. Expertise can
improve the relative efﬁciency of manager-subjects
in experiments only when they are able to recog-
nize the similarity between the laboratory context and
their ﬁeld experience. Here, we could expect that con-
ducting the experiment within the company context
and performing an abstract task, which reproduces
characteristics of executive teamwork, should induce
a greater level of performance from managers. This
paper is also innovative because it examines these
effects in a team context with individual and team
rewards.
The task required of participants consisted of
searching for the highest value of a multiple-peaked
function in a 2-dimensional space. This task has a
cognitive component because intense concentration
is required because of uncertainty and time pres-
sure, and there is a monetary cost linked to the cho-
sen speed of progression. This real-task experiment
adds to the limited number of experimental papers
(Dickinson 1999, Sillamaa 1999, van Dijk et al. 2001,
Falk and Ichino 2003, Gneezy et al. 2003), which study
rewards and behavior in a real work setting. Many
experiments, which require subjects to choose an effort
level not related to a real effort conﬁrm that mon-
etary incentives do matter, but assume the equiva-
lence between intention of contribution and effort, and
between disutility of effort and money. Our exper-
iment also differs from naturally occurring experi-
ments (e.g., Lazear 2000) or ﬁeld experiments (Erev
et al. 1993) in which subjects perform a task in a real
work environment. In this study, manager-subjects
undertake tasks, which reproduce aspects of a man-
ager’s job under a familiar structure of incentives.
They make their decisions in an artiﬁcial environment
of anonymous interactions, according to instructions
using neutral wording and without ﬁeld referents.
Our design involves two parts: (1) teams are homo-
geneous and are paid according to the rules in effect
before the merger of the pharmaceutical ﬁrms and
(2) the teams remain homogeneous or are formed
randomly with participants originating from each of
the two merged companies or from both schools; all
are paid according to the rules in use after the merger.
These treatments are aimed at disentangling the effect
of the shift in team composition and the impact of the
shift in incentive schemes.
Our main results indicate that there is a pure effect
on performance of the shift in incentives after the
merger. They show that the past does matter in as
much as some managers reduce their effort when they
are potentially mixed with managers from the other
incoming ﬁrm. This may be the result of the sorting
effect of previous incentives schemes: Paying execu-
tives under different rules has probably contributed to
the creation of attitudes toward cooperation in teams.
Lastly, we ﬁnd evidence that manager-subjects and
student-subjects differ more in strategy than in sub-
stance, with managers being oriented more to the
maximization of performance, while students focus
more on cost minimization. In §2, the design of the
experiment is outlined and §3 presents the experimen-
tal procedures. The empirical results are discussed
in §4. In §5, we conclude.
2. Experimental Design
The experiment consists of two parts. In the ﬁrst part
it reconstitutes the pay structure of the ﬁrms before
they merge and, in the second part, the pay structure
prevailing in the merger. The nature of the task to be
performed during the experiment remains the same,
thus allowing an analysis of the consequences on per-
formance of both changes in the payment structure
and of team composition. In this section, we present
the design of the task, the structure of payment
schemes, the treatments, and information conditions.
2.1. Task Design and Behavioral Heuristics
One original aspect of this experiment lies in the
design of a task, which mimics some aspects of the
content of a manager’s job (concentration, variability,
adjustment of means to targets, and ability to cope
with uncertainty under time pressure). The challenge
was to be able to discriminate the impact of a cog-
nitive effort on the outcome from that of ability. The
task consists of searching for the highest value ofMontmarquette et al.: Redesigning Teams and Incentives in a Merger
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an increasing function built in a 2-dimensional space
deﬁned vertically by height  H  and horizontally
by distance  D  from the origin, with H ∈  0 100 ,
D ∈  0 300  and with HMax = f D . It is common
knowledge that the curve can have single or multiple
peaks. When the period starts, the box in which the
curve will appear is fully black. During a one-minute
period, the subject progressively uncovers the curve
on his computer screen starting at the origin, by click-
ing a button.1 The subject progresses by discrete steps
on the horizontal axis. She can stop her progression
at any moment. The outcome achieved by a subject in
a period is given by the maximum height reached on
the curve, which depends notably on the number of
moves.
The monetary cost associated with the task is rep-
resented by the choice of the speed of progression,
i.e., the work pace. Two buttons are available to the
subjects: (1) a “one-step button” used to uncover the
curves at a regular speed and is cost free and (2) a
“two-step button” that doubles the speed but which
costs 0.4 point. The subject can switch speeds at will.
This design allows a control over the subject’s task
costs and makes possible an analysis of efﬁciency.
It is impossible to reach maximum height during
the one-minute period allowed by using the regular
speed only, with the exception of 1 of the 13 ran-
domly occurring curves. The subjects do not know
this information. A subject’s outcome depends on the
use of two-step moves and on chance, because there is
uncertainty about the distances from the origins to the
peaks. Therefore, the cognitive dimension of the task
relates to the uncertainty about the shape of the curve,
to time pressure, and to the decision to use the one-
or two-step button. Unlike the real-task experiment
of van Dijk et al. (2001), ours involves no algorithm
enabling the discovery of a peak at minimum cost
while under time constraints; no one beneﬁts from
previous learning. At each point on the curve, the
subject cannot infer from the already uncovered part
of the curve the slope of the curve at the next point.
The subject cannot discover one single algorithm but
must build heuristic grounded on a continuous trade-
off between the speed to choose and the time left. For
example, if a subject has already used many extra cost
moves and the curve remains ﬂat, paying each addi-
tional two-step move requires a continuous trade-off
between its marginal cost and its expected marginal
revenue. Compared to a traditional experiment where
effort values are chosen from a payoff table with a
unique trade-off between cost and outcome, our task
involves an unknown optimal way of reaching the
maximum height at a minimum cost because subjects
1 The experiment was computerized using the REGATE program.
All curves used in this experiment and the instructions are available
at http://platypus.gate.cnrs.fr/groupware/g_gate/Raventis.htm.
do not know the locations of peaks. The property
of duality is not checked: The minimization of cost
does not correspond to the maximization of the objec-
tive. The multiplicity of heuristics and uncertainty
concerning the location of peaks prevent any theoret-
ical prediction.2
In short, there are two aspects to the task chosen
in this experiment: the decision to use the costless or
costly way to progress and the speed of progression,
where both can be measured. The cognitive problem
of how to reach a higher altitude cannot be mea-
sured, however. For the rest of this paper, the altitude
reached is the observable outcome of the cognitive
effort. This output and the cost of progression are the
variables to be explained.
2.2. Payment Schemes
Another point of originality lies in the design of com-
pensation schemes that combine ﬁxed pay and perfor-
mance pay, the latter involving both individual and
team incentives. The game involves teams consist-
ing of three subjects who have to uncover the same
curve. Subjects are not allowed to communicate with
teammates and are not informed of their simulta-
neous progression. Individual earnings from a task
in a given period are calculated from the sum of
three elements whose amount and relative proportion
depend on the stage of the game and the treatment.
Speciﬁcally, earnings are deﬁned as:   i =F  +I  +T ,
with   =  X Y . X and Y correspond to the two
ﬁrms before they merge, and for simplicity, X and Y
subjects keep their respective labels after the merger
to track their origin. F  is a ﬁxed wage earned by
subject i when her individual outcome reaches a
ﬁrst threshold, Hmin
1 , deﬁned by the height reached.
This threshold can always be achieved with no cost
steps in the time allowed, but this information is
not given to subjects. An employer would consider
a distance achieved below this benchmark as profes-
sional misconduct. I  is an individual bonus earned




1 . T  is a team reward obtained when
the sum of individual outcomes by the team of





1 . A subject may earn this reward
even though she does not reach an output level
greater than the level giving her the ﬁxed wage or
the individual bonus. This creates an incentive to
free ride.
At each repetition of the game, a new curve is ran-
domly drawn whose shape determines the extent of
uncertainty faced by the subjects. The analysis of per-
2 Once the curve is known, it is possible to ﬁnd the best strategy to
reach the highest peak at the lowest cost. A referee’s suggestion to
compare the subject’s behavior with this optimal strategy appears
worthwhile to pursue to study the learning process and the cogni-
tive effort of the participants.Montmarquette et al.: Redesigning Teams and Incentives in a Merger
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Table 1 Payment Schemes in ECU
Part 1—All treatments Part 2—Fixed treatment
Group composition Teams of Teams of Teams of Teams of Part 2—Mixed treatment
height reached X subjects Y subjects X subjects Y subjects Teams of X and Y subjects
Hi <4 0 0000 0
40≤Hi <60 4 0606060 60
60≤Hi ≤1 0 0 60608 08 0 8 0
3
1 Hi ≥240 100 100 120 120 120
Note. For the teams of X subjects, the table should be read as follows. In the ﬁrst part of the experiment, if an X
subject realizes an outcome lower than the ﬁrst threshold of 40, she receives no payoff. If she reaches a height
between the ﬁrst (40) and the second threshold (60), she receives only a ﬁxed wage of 40  FX . If the subject
reaches the second threshold, she receives a payoff of 60, consisting of the sum of the ﬁxed wage and the individual
bonus  FX + IX . If the subject’s team reaches a cumulated height of 240, the subject receives a payoff of 100,
corresponding to the sum of the ﬁxed wage, the individual bonus and the team reward  FX +IX +TX . Part 2 and
the teams of Y subjects should be interpreted in a similar manner.
formance and costs must control for the degree of
difﬁculty of the curves. Because of the structure of
the compensation package, the difﬁculty of a curve
depends on the location of the various thresholds.
An index of difﬁculty is calculated as: d =  D1 2 +
 D2 −D1 2 +  D3 − D2 , with D1 being the abscissa at
the origin of the ﬁrst threshold; D2, the abscissa of the
second threshold; and D3, the abscissa of the maxi-
mum height. The more distant the ﬁrst threshold is
from the origin and the greater the distance between
the ﬁrst and second thresholds, the more difﬁcult it
becomes to reach additional rewards.
2.3. Experimental Treatments and Information
Conditions
The experiment aims at identifying the separate inﬂu-
ences of changes in incentives and in team composi-
tion. To measure the impact of changes in payment
schemes, a session was designed having 2 parts of
10 periods each, with a random order of presentation
of 13 payoff curves. In the ﬁrst part, used as a bench-
mark, we reproduce initial payment schemes that
were used before the merger; in the second part, the
payment scheme in use after the merger is applied.
In the ﬁrst part, we team X and Y subjects separately,
each playing under the payment scheme used in their
initial company. Members of X teams may receive a
ﬁxed wage, an individual bonus, and a team reward.
Earnings for members of Y teams are derived from a
ﬁxed wage and a team reward only (see Table 1). The
proportion of potential total earnings from the ﬁxed
wage is higher for Y subjects than for X subjects, but
the same performance is required from all subjects
to trigger their ﬁxed payment and team reward. In
the second part of the session, the payment scheme
is the one used after the merger and is the same for
all subjects. It includes a ﬁxed wage, an individual
bonus, and a team reward. Compared to the ﬁrst part,
Y subjects may now receive an individual bonus and
X subjects have seen an increase in their ﬁxed wage.
In avoiding a decrease in the absolute level of any pay
component of earnings between the two parts of the
session, the maximum earnings all subjects can obtain
is now 120 experimental currency unit (ECU) instead
of 100.
To measure the impact of team composition on
performance, a new matching treatment was intro-
duced in two sessions. This treatment is referred as
the mixed treatment, where teams of three randomly
associated subjects are formed potentially involving
both X and Y subjects. The ﬁxed treatment used in
the ﬁrst part of all sessions, where X and Y sub-
jects are teamed exclusively with X and Y subjects,
respectively, is maintained in the second part in one
session. The ﬁxed treatment serves as a benchmark
against which the effect of team composition after
the merger is tested. A stranger-matching protocol is
always used. In the second part of the session, only
team composition is changed and not the size of the
teams.3
All subjects, except those playing the ﬁxed treat-
ment, knew of the existence of two categories of sub-
jects in equal numbers in the room, but they were
kept unaware of the meaning of labels X and Y. Sub-
jects learned their own identity by reading the instruc-
tion sheet and were notiﬁed that they would keep
the same identity throughout the session. The instruc-
tion sheet for the ﬁrst 10 periods mentioned that they
were matched with two other subjects belonging to
the same category as themselves and that the com-
position of groups would, within the same category,
change with each new period. They were informed
that they would never know the identity and the pay-
off of their successive teammates. Subjects knew the
description of the task to be performed and the payoff
structure applicable to their category. The participants
were not given information about the payoff structure
of the other category of subjects, were aware that the
3 The negative impact on efﬁciency of the increasing size of
teams in a merger has been documented by Camerer and Knez
(1994).Montmarquette et al.: Redesigning Teams and Incentives in a Merger
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same task was to be achieved by the three members of
their group, and had no current information about the
progression of their teammates on the curve. During
play, their screen indicates the time currently left, the
cumulated cost of their two-step decisions, and the
height of the different thresholds reached. At the end
of each period, a historic table gave each subject feed-
back on their own outcome, the outcome (cumulative
height) achieved by their team, total cost, amount of
compensation obtained, by source, and total payoff
net of costs.
In the second part of the session, subjects were
informed about the payoff structure of the ﬁrst part
for each of the two categories. The new payoff struc-
ture common to all subjects was explained. In one
session, an equal number of subjects from both cat-
egories continued to play under the ﬁxed treatment
for periods 11–20. In two sessions, subjects drawn in
equal numbers from X and Y were informed that dur-
ing the remaining 10 periods, they could be matched
randomly with members of the other category.4
3. Experimental Procedures
The experiment was ﬁrst conducted with managers
of the pharmaceutical company about two years after
the merger and it was later replicated with students
in engineering and business from Lyon and Montréal.
Thirty-six volunteer executives were recruited by
e-mail with average annual earnings of EUR 69,000,
consisting of 18 managers from each incoming ﬁrm.
To limit uncontrolled peer-group effects, sessions
were designed such that the participants represented
a large diversity of departments and came from dif-
ferent geographical locations.5 The experiment was
conducted at the company headquarters in Paris on
the same day to limit the dissemination of informa-
tion. In the ﬁrst 2 sessions, 12 participants  6X 6Y 
were subjected to the mixed-treatment protocol. In
the third session, 12 participants played under the
ﬁxed-treatment protocol. On average, a session lasted
75 minutes including practice periods. Transactions
were conducted in ECUs, with ECU convertible to
euros at the rate 150 ECU = EUR 4.5. A showup fee
of 8 euros was added. On average, a subject earned
EUR 51.45 (S.D.=3 75). Subjects were paid a few days
later with vouchers.
Upon arrival, each manager had to register and was
invited to draw a ticket from an envelope to assign
him or her a computer. In fact, company-speciﬁc
4 It would have been interesting to test whether belonging to the
majority category or the minority category of a team would inﬂu-
ence individual behavior within teams. However, this would have
required collecting a far greater number of observations. For this
reason, we did not inform subjects about the detailed composition
of their teams.
5 Overall, participants came from 4 different sites and 22 depart-
ments.
envelopes were presented to subjects according to
their originating company, but subjects were unaware
of this allocation rule. Subjects discovered a set of
written instructions for the ﬁrst part of the session
under their keyboard. As the payment schemes dif-
fered among X and Y participants, the experimenter
did not read the instructions aloud.6 Instructions were
phrased in neutral terms with queries answered in
private. Three practice rounds were run before the
experiment began. At the end of the ﬁrst part, the
game stopped and further instructions for the second
part were distributed, without any questions allowed.
This experiment was replicated with 72 student-
subjects, in the experimental laboratories of GATE–
Lyon and at the LUBC3E–CIRANO in Montréal.
Three sessions were organized over 2 days. The two
mixed-treatment sessions were played online, the
REGATE software enabling the online reshufﬂing of
groups between Montréal and Lyon subjects. During
each mixed-treatment session, 12 French subjects and
12 Canadian subjects interacted as subjects X and Y
without being informed that they were playing with
subjects abroad. The third session (ﬁxed treatment)
involved 12 students at each location. Sessions were
conducted under the same conditions as sessions with
manager-subjects, except that the ECU were convert-
ible at the rate 150 ECU = EUR 1 for the French
subjects and at the rate 150 ECU = C$1.5 for the
Canadian subjects. A show-up fee of EUR 4 or C$6
was added. On average, a subject earned EUR 12.89
(S.D. = EUR 0.80). Subjects were immediately paid in
cash in a separate room.
4. Experimental Results
4.1. Overall Statistics
In Figures 1–3, we present histograms of average out-
put achieved, average rate of free riders and average
return to output level plotted against treatment, sub-
ject pool, and the group of periods (1–10 or 11–20).
Figure 1 shows that the reaction to incentives dif-
fers according to the subject pools: the average out-
put level is higher for managers than for students
throughout the experiment. For the managers, out-
put increases in the second part of the experiment
under the merged company’s compensation package.
This increase is particularly noticeable in the ﬁxed-
treatment sessions, where the only change introduced
relates to the increase in monetary incentives; when
both incentives and team composition are changed,
6 Reading instructions aloud guarantees that rules are common
knowledge. However, the section of instructions related to different
payment schemes of the X and Y subjects must remain unknown
until the end of the ﬁrst part of the session. Reading aloud only
other sections of the instructions would have focused undue atten-
tion on the question of compensation.Montmarquette et al.: Redesigning Teams and Incentives in a Merger
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Note. The average indices of difﬁculty of the curves are the following: In the
student sessions, periods 1–10: 22,949; periods 11–20 in the mixed treat-
ment: 24,047; periods 11–20 in the ﬁxed sessions: 21,635. In the manager-
sessions, periods 1–10: 22,949; periods 11–20 in the mixed treatment:
22,339; periods 11–20 in the ﬁxed sessions: 21,635.
the increase in managers’ average output is not
signiﬁcant.
These different output levels may be related to dif-
ferences in the proportion of free riders in the two
pools. Because of the team reward in the payment
scheme, our experiment can be connected with the
voluntary contributions mechanism (VCM) in pub-
lic good games. It is interesting to verify whether
the coexistence of a ﬁxed wage, an individual bonus,
and a team reward in the same compensation scheme
changes the behavior toward cooperation as typically
observed in these games. Transposing the strict def-
inition of free riding in the VCM to our experiment
means that a free rider is deﬁned here in the follow-
ing way. In part 1, X is qualiﬁed as a free rider in
period t when her output is ≤60, i.e., when the subject
does not contribute to the outcome beyond the level
that triggers her individual bonus. The same condi-
tion applies for part 2. In part 1, Y is qualiﬁed as a
free rider when her output in period t is ≤40, i.e.,
when she does not contribute to the team outcome
beyond the level that secures her ﬁxed wage and, in
part 2, when her output level is ≤60. In a typical
public-good game, whereas each subject has a domi-
nant strategy not to contribute, the level of contribu-
tion is initially positive and declines with repetition
(see Ledyard 1995). Figure 2 shows the rate of free rid-
ers by subject pool and by treatment for parts 1 and 2.
It indicates that there is a low proportion of free riders
compared to traditional results of public good games,
probably because of both the coexistence of individ-
ual and collective payments and the impossibility of
calculating the marginal per capita return of investing
in the team outcome.7 The proportion of free riders is
lower among managers than among students in both
parts.8 This proportion is lower when the threshold
that triggers the greater individual reward is low. It
increases in part 2 in both subject pools, particularly
in the mixed sessions, and this cannot be explained
by a restart effect at the 11th period of the game as
will be shown later. This is in line with the declin-
ing cooperation over time usually found in public-
good experiments, and could be compared with the
differences observed between stranger- and partner-
matching protocols (see Keser and van Winden 2000).
Figure 3 displays the average return to output level,
i.e., the average output achieved divided by the aver-
age cost level. On average, managers achieve a lower
level of efﬁciency than students. The former perform
a greater output but at a higher cost. In part 2, the
average level of efﬁciency rises slightly in both sub-
ject pools.
However, overall statistics are uncontrolled for
time, difﬁculty of the curves and individual effects.
Regression analyses controlling for these dimensions
are thus required to identify the determinants of two
endogenous variables: output levels and costs. In
Table 2, we present the deﬁnition and descriptive
statistics of variables used in these regressions.
Exogenous variables are the period, category of
subjects, mode of compensation, composition of
groups, and an index of difﬁculty for each curve.
The “lagged output achieved of the other group
members” variable assesses whether subjects mod-
ulate their outputs to what their teammates did in
the previous period. Interaction variables involving
the Y subjects are created to test whether X and Y
7 This is evocative of the result found by Charness et al. (2004), that
in a gift-exchange game, there is less reciprocity when the payoffs
for different actions are made clearer.
8 The observation that managers free ride less than students is
reminiscent of the Hannan et al. (2002) result that MBA students
(which are more like managers) do more gift exchange than other
students.Montmarquette et al.: Redesigning Teams and Incentives in a Merger
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Table 2 Variables and Descriptive Statistics
Mean (standard deviation)
Variable Deﬁnition Managers Students
Endogenous variables
Output achieved Output levels reached by the subjects 78 04 73 9
 20 96   20 680 
Cost Costs of outputs supported by the subjects 16 601 2  75
 13 19   11 39 
Exogenous variables
1st period effect 1 if the 1st period, 0 05 0 05
0 otherwise 0 95 0 95
11th period effect 1 if the 11th period, 0 05 0 05
0 otherwise 0 95 0 95
Y subject 1 if the individual is a Y subject, 0 50 0 50
0 otherwise (X subject) 0 50 0 50
Mixed session 1 if X and Y subjects can interact, 0 33 0 33
0 otherwise 0 670  67
Mixed session and Y subject 1 if Y is involved in a mixed session, 0 160  16
0 otherwise 0 84 0 84
Mode of compensation in part 1 1 if part 1 (periods 1–10), 0 50 0 50
0 if part 2 (periods 11–20) 0 50 0 50
Mode of compensation in part 1 1 if a Y subject in part 1, 0 25 0 25
and Y subject 0 otherwise 0 25 0 25
Lagged output levels of the Output of the other members of the group 154 88∗ 146 49∗
other members of the group in the preceding period  32 07   34 67 
Lagged output levels of the other Output of the other members of the group 155 15∗∗ 147 58∗∗
members of the group and Y in the preceding period and Y  32 37   35 04 
Index of difﬁculty Index of difﬁculty of the curve/100 225 27 230 96
 143 10   143 36 
Index of difﬁculty squared Index of difﬁculty squared 71 798 18 73 882 02
 72 847 8   72 466 04 
Index of difﬁculty and period Interaction of index of difﬁculty and period 2 498 62  581 17
 2 482 7   2 512 12 
Period Periods 1–20 10 51 0  5
Logarithm of period Logarithm of period 2 12 2 12
∗1st and 11th periods excluded.
∗∗For Y subjects only and 1st and 11th periods excluded.
subjects behave differently. Coefﬁcient estimates of
the variable “mode of compensation in part 1” report
the decisions of the X subjects in part 1 relative to
their decisions under the mode of compensation in
part 2 (element of the constant term). With the coefﬁ-
cients of the “mixed session” variable, we further dis-
tinguish the decisions of the X subjects in the mixed
sessions in part 2 relative to the ﬁxed sessions in
part 2. The decisions of the Y subjects in part 1 are the
sum of the coefﬁcients of the variables “Y subject,”
“mode of compensation in part 1,” and “Y subject and
mode of compensation in part 1.” This last variable is
needed as the modes of compensation differ in part 1
between X and Y subjects. Summing up, coefﬁcient
estimates of variables “Y subject,” “mixed session,”
and “Y subject and mixed session” give the decisions
of Y subjects in the mixed sessions in part 2. The coef-
ﬁcient of the “Y subject” variable shows the decisions
of “Y subjects” in the ﬁxed sessions in part 2.
The index of difﬁculty and the period variables
enter regressions with interacting variables and non-
linear forms. Instead of including a dummy for each
period to control for time effects, we distinguish the
variable “logarithm of the period” from the “peri-
ods 1–20” variable to separate two potentially adverse
effects. While the former may account for elements
such as boredom that could push output level down
over time, the latter may account for learning of
the task that could increase output over time. Lastly,
demographic variables such as gender and age were
entered to control for their potential impact, but
because none proved to be signiﬁcant, they were sub-
sequently removed.
4.2. Econometric Results
Column 1 of Tables 3 and 4 display the results for
the students and managers, respectively, on the sub-
jects’ output achieved. Column 2 of both tables report
the results on the determinants of cost levels. TheMontmarquette et al.: Redesigning Teams and Incentives in a Merger
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Table 3 Students: Determinants ofOutput Levels and Costs
Output Cost
Panel random∗ Panel random∗∗
Variable Coefﬁcient t-ratio Coefﬁcient t-ratio
Constant 135 9a 26 51 1  3a 4 21
1st period −43 09
a −10 9 0 671 0 362
11th period −4 858 −1 460  387 0 303
Y subject 3 045 0 858 −1 9608 −0 831
Mixed −0 7015 −0 324 −1 322 −1 24
Y and mixed 1 908 0 625 1 912 1 27
Mode of compensation in part 1 −2 740 −1 02 −5 27
a −4 10
Y and mode of compensation in part 1 2 8961  14 1 410 1 14
Lagged output levels of other group members −0 01724 −1 17 0 02892
a 4 18
Y and lagged output levels of other group members −0 01738 −1 23 −0 01186
b −1 79
Index of difﬁculty −0 3076
a −24 20  03958
a 6 63
Index of difﬁculty squared 0 0004981
a 21 6 −0 00003859
a −3 57
Index of difﬁculty and period 0 001846
a 2 73 0 0007233
a 2 28
Periods 1–20 1 0409
a 2 50 −0 6201
a −3 17
Logarithm of period −18 20
a −7 35 0 4660 0 968
Adjusted R2 0.3569 0.163
Number of observations 1,440 1,440
∗Linear one-way random effects model. Lagrange multiplier test versus ordinary least squares (OLS) = 433 71
(1 df, probability value=0 00000).
∗∗Linear one-way random effects model. Lagrange multiplier test versus OLS = 2 761 10 (1 df, probability
value=0 000000).
a Signiﬁcant at 5% level.
b Signiﬁcant at 10% level.
cost incurred corresponds to the number of occasions
the two-step button was used to perform the task.
All econometric estimates are obtained with a linear
one-way random effects model.9
For the students considered as a benchmark, few
variables signiﬁcantly inﬂuence outputs, except peri-
ods and the difﬁculty of the task. In contrast, the cost
levels are inﬂuenced by more elements. A change in
monetary incentives in the second part of the exper-
iment makes students react by increasing their cost
levels but not their output. An increase in the output
levels of their teammates during the preceding period
incites them to increase their costs, particularly for
the X subjects. Lastly, costs decline over time and the
relationship between the difﬁculty of the curves and
the costs indicates a reverse U-shape.
In contrast, we observe for managers a signiﬁcant
and substantial increase in outputs by both X and
Y subjects in part 2 relative to part 1. The change
in incentives after the merger increases outputs by
almost 12 points. The change in the composition of
teams exerts no signiﬁcant inﬂuence on output. Note,
however, the negative but statistically insigniﬁcant
coefﬁcient of the interaction variable “Y subject and
mixed”: Y subjects, knowing that they may be inter-
9 Let Eit measure individual i’s output level in period t, explained
by a vector of observable variables zit, the corresponding param-
eter vector  , a random individual component  i and a random
variable  it: Eit = zit  +  it +  i, i = 1     n, t = 1     T with the
usual assumptions,  it ∼N 0 1 ,  it ∼N 0  2 ,     =0.
acting with X subjects, have a tendency to lower their
output levels. Despite the stranger-matching proto-
col, Y subjects are also inﬂuenced by the behavior of
their teammates in the preceding period: An increase
in teammate outputs motivates subjects to increase
their own output. It should also be noted that, if
we observe a negative ﬁrst-period effect on output
achieved, there is no restart effect at the 11th period.
The difﬁculty of the curves and the number of periods
affect outputs in a nonlinear way.
The change in composition of the teams in part 2
has no signiﬁcant impact on effort decisions, how-
ever, it exerts a determinant impact on the cost lev-
els chosen by the subjects. Ceteris paribus, X subjects
increase their costs in a mixed session by 6.23 units
relative to a ﬁxed session, while Y subjects substan-
tially reduce theirs by 8.38 units when they know they
may be teamed with X subjects.10 The relationship
between the difﬁculty of the curves and the costs indi-
cates a reverse U-shape as with the students. Lastly,
there is a positive ﬁrst-period effect on cost levels, but
costs decline more linearly as the experiment evolves.
4.3. Discussion
This section will focus on the reactions to the shifts in
incentives, in team composition and in the difﬁculty
10 From the calculation:  8 06− 8 06+6 23−14 61  . The ﬁrst term
is the coefﬁcient of the variable for Y participants in part 2 when
groups are ﬁxed. The second term represents the value of the coef-
ﬁcients for Y participants in part 2 when groups are mixed.Montmarquette et al.: Redesigning Teams and Incentives in a Merger
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Table 4 Managers: Determinants ofOutput Levels and Costs
Output Cost
Panel random∗ Panel random∗∗
Variable Coefﬁcient t-ratio Coefﬁcient t-ratio
Constant 125 32
a 13 3 6 197 1 13
1st period −11 80 −1 59 10 25
a 2 42
11th period −1 539 −0 289 0 967 0 318
Y subject −3 030 −0 526 8 06
a 2 16
Mixed 1 500 0 414 6 23
a 2 83
Y and mixed −7 194 −1 41 −14 61
a −4 69
Mode of compensation in part 1 −11 791
a −2 47 −1 805 −0 653
Y and mode of compensation in part 1 −4 559 −1 04 −10 09
a −3 88
Lagged output levels of other group members 0 03469 1 251 0 02427 1 53
Y and lagged output levels of other group members 0 05420
a 2 33 0 0195 1 37
Index of difﬁculty −0 2132
a −9 41 0 05503
a 4 27
Index of difﬁculty squared 0 0003381
a 8 37 −0 00007559
a −3 29
Index of difﬁculty and period 0 003394
a 2 82 0 001122
b 1 64
Periods 1–20 −1 354
b −1 83 −1 037
a −2 47
Logarithm of period −7 768
b −1 76 2 799 1 11
Adjusted R2 0.1562 0.1792
Number of observations 720 720
∗Linear one-way random effects model. Lagrange multiplier test versus OLS = 12 06(1 df, probability
value=0 000515).
∗∗Linear one-way random effects model. Lagrange multiplier test versus OLS = 114 41 (1 df, probability
value=0 000000).
a Signiﬁcant at 5% level.
b Signiﬁcant at 10% level.
of the task. Our results provide clear evidence of
differences in reactions to a change in monetary
incentives between the subject pools. The new com-
pensation scheme in the second part does increase the
output levels of X and Y managers. In contrast, the
same monetary incentives, controlling for other vari-
ables, incite students to increase not their outputs, but
their costs to accomplish the different tasks imposed
on them. Among managers, Y participants substan-
tially decrease their costs in part 2. Another differ-
ence is the reaction to lagged output levels of the
other group members. Y managers increase their out-
puts if the output levels of their previous teammates
increase. Student participants modify their cost levels
to the previous output levels of their group members.
These results show that the change in incentives
inﬂuences both subject pools, with managers appear-
ing to be objective driven, while students are cost
driven. This is not that surprising as managers in
their professional life are evaluated, remunerated, and
promoted by meeting their objectives whatever the
cost they must incur to do so (e.g., long working
hours). For most students, a large part of the return
of their academic effort is from lowering their cost
(time devoted to studying a speciﬁc matter) to obtain
good grades. Note that we were able to observe this
kind of result because we used a real costly task.
If the student-subjects appear to be more money
maximizing than managers in the laboratory, this
cannot be attributed to the differences in the opportu-
nity costs to participate, because this was taken into
account in the conversion rates.
The changing composition of teams also inﬂuences
the behavior of subjects. Within the same category
(X or Y), most subjects are inﬂuenced by the behav-
ior of their preceding teammates although teams are
reshufﬂed each period. This might suggest that the
subjects refer to their category as a whole. However,
the linear one-way effects models recognized that
subjects are heterogeneous; our results suggest that
subject pools and categories are also heterogeneous.
Both X and Y student-subjects are inﬂuenced by the
output of the subjects they were previously teamed
with but they are not inﬂuenced by the merging
between categories in the second part of the exper-
iment, thus, they do not refer to a speciﬁc category
but to the whole set of subjects. By contrast, after the
merger, the decisions of the category of managers who
are more sensitive to the outputs of previous team-
mates (the Y managers) change behavior knowing
that they may be interacting with subjects from the
other category; they become less cooperative and they
substantially reduce their costs and, to a lesser degree,
their outputs. On the contrary, X managers who are
not inﬂuenced by the behavior of previous teammates
react positively to the merging of the categories inMontmarquette et al.: Redesigning Teams and Incentives in a Merger
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the same teams. Groups of reference are not the same
across subject pools.
In traditional experimental economics literature,
reaction to others’ decisions is usually characterized
by a reciprocity concept (see Fehr and Falk 2002). Our
experiment is run with randomly re-matched subjects
at each period, so this can also be explained by learn-
ing and conditional cooperation: Subjects learn the
behavior of other subjects in the same category or in
the same room and constantly update their beliefs.
But more puzzling is the reaction to the mixing of cat-
egories after the merger. Three explanations could be
evoked. A ﬁrst explanation might be that the merger
changes preferences by introducing new incentives.
This explanation cannot help because we measure
the impact of a shift in team composition with other
things equal, i.e., we control for changes in incentives.
The psychological concept of “in group/out group”
(Tajfel et al. 1971) might affect the cooperative behav-
ior of participants. This explanation cannot directly
help here because students and managers do not react
in the same way. If managers were able to transfer
their experience of the merger into the laboratory,
whereas the students were not able to do so, this
psychological effect might play a role for the man-
agers. But it does not explain why X and Y managers
did not react similarly. A more convincing explana-
tion refers to a sorting effect of incentives as docu-
mented by Lazear (2000). The incoming companies
that merged may differ in recruiting different pro-
ﬁles of managers then developing different cultures
because of their various incentive schemes. The pre-
existence of an individual bonus may contribute to
focusing on one’s own performance instead on the
other’s output.
The reaction to the difﬁculty of the task is similar
for managers and students. The U-shape curve sug-
gests that more difﬁcult tasks may actually elicit, to
some extent, more output. This job-challenge effect is
present even in the later stages of the experiment (see
the “index of difﬁculty and period” variable), whereas
the logarithm of period exerts a negative effect on the
output level (that could be interpreted as boredom or
tiredness). This result is consistent with the psycho-
logical literature showing that challenging goals lead
to higher performance than easy goals (Locke et al.
1981). The job challenge may even be at the initia-
tive of the subject herself (e.g., if she uses targets like
reaching the second peak). The relationship between
the difﬁculty of the curves and the costs supported
by all participants indicates a reverse U-shape. If the
task is too difﬁcult, subjects increase their outputs
but without resorting to costly two-step moves. This
result reinforces our preceding analysis: An increased
difﬁculty does not discourage output under the con-
dition that subjects can save on their costs. Lastly,
there is a positive ﬁrst-period effect on the cost levels
(signiﬁcant for the managers), but costs decline more
linearly as the experiment evolves. This is possibly
because of a learning effect on the task, on the other’s
behavior, and on the best moment to use the costly
moves. Students appear to learn more than managers
as they play the game because they not only decrease
their costs, but also increase their outputs (see vari-
able “periods 1–20”).11
5. Summary and Conclusion
Executive behavior with respect to performance,
motivation, and cooperation is a major element in the
success or failure of a merger between companies.
Traditionally, economists have suggested looking for
an adapted compensation policy to facilitate cooper-
ation within groups of individuals coming from dif-
ferent corporate cultures. The aim of this paper is
to check whether a harmonization of compensation
packages is sufﬁcient to motivate all managers to
cooperate to the same extent. A laboratory experi-
ment has been run involving managers of two large
pharmaceutical companies that recently went through
a merger. The experimental design introduced var-
ious compensation schemes, including an incentive
scheme combining individual and team incentives
that were implemented in the context of a real task.
As in most mergers, these manager-subjects have
experienced the redesigning of both compensation
schemes and team composition in their newly merged
company. The protocol reproduced the pre- and post-
merger situation in terms of both compensation and
team composition. To complement this experiment, a
replication with a subject pool consisting of French
and Canadian students was conducted that can serve
as a benchmark.
The results show that ﬁnancial incentives do work
in improving output achieved in accordance with
standard results (Prendergast 1999). However, the
uniﬁed incentives are not entirely sufﬁcient to create
cooperation among heterogeneous groups, as already
experimentally observed (Meidinger et al. 2003). The
past matters. In contrast with Nalbantian and Schotter
(1997), it matters more in terms of shifting team
11 Despite their different strategies, the similarity of students’ and
managers’ average net payoffs is striking. However, with more
output achieved by the managers, the average surplus of a
hypothetical ﬁrm (height×a constant−wage costs) is higher when
employing manager-subjects rather than student-subjects. The net
payoffs are higher under the Y payment scheme than under the
X payment scheme before the merger. After the merger, net payoffs
are higher when teams, whether composed of students or man-
agers, are homogeneous. In contrast, the hypothetical ﬁrm’s perfor-
mance is greater under the X payment scheme before the merger
and with mixed teams after the merger.Montmarquette et al.: Redesigning Teams and Incentives in a Merger
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composition than in terms of incentives, because the
change from the two premerger incentive schemes
to the uniﬁed one increases output in the same pro-
portion. Individuals coming from different corporate
cultures, likely with different fairness norms and
social-comparison behavior, tend to react differently
in the mixed treatment part of our experiment. This
may result notably from a sorting effect, attributable
to various selection policies in the originating ﬁrms:
Companies with different incentive policies proba-
bly attract different types of managers. This suggests
that shifting team composition may limit, at least in
the short run, the efﬁciency of a new uniﬁed com-
pensation policy if not taken into account. Merging
cultures requires more time than merging incentives
and deserves special attention. Our experiment also
shows that introducing complex tasks is not necessar-
ily detrimental to performance and cooperation. The
concept of job challenge is perhaps more important
to soliciting greater effort among employees than is
usually suggested in current literature.
Results from the student-subject pool differ in strat-
egy more than in substance, allowing conﬁrmation
of the external validity of laboratory experiments.
In contrast to the managers, students react to an
increase in monetary incentives by accepting more
costs to complete a given task rather than increas-
ing their output levels. They are cost driven, whereas
managers appear to be objective driven. This means
that the managers are also more cooperative and free
ride less than the student-subjects. Our results cor-
roborate the interpretation of Cooper et al. (1999) in
that when they are able to recognize the similarity
between the laboratory context and their ﬁeld expe-
rience, manager-subjects may choose different strate-
gic options than inexperienced subjects. Moreover, it
may indicate that if students are more inclined to
minimize costs than experts in the laboratory, when
one observes the existence of other-regarding pref-
erences in traditional experiments involving student-
subjects, one may deduce that this deviation from
the equilibrium is likely more developed in real
settings.
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